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Abstract
Theoretical models of information asymmetry have identied a tradeo between the desire
to learn and the desire to prevent an opponent from learning private information. This paper
reports a laboratory experiment that investigates if actual bidders account for this tradeo,
using a sequential procurement auction with private cost information and varying information
revelation policies. Specically, the Complete Information Policy, where all submitted bids are
revealed between auctions, is compared against the Incomplete Information Policy, where only
the winning bid is revealed. The experimental results are largely consistent with the theoretical
predictions. For example, bidders pool with other types to prevent an opponent from learning
signicantly more often under a Complete Information Policy. Also as predicted, the procurer
pays less when employing an Incomplete Information Policy only when the market is highly
competitive. Bids are usually more aggressive than the risk neutral quantitative prediction,
which is usually consistent with risk aversion.
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In multistage non-cooperative games with information asymmetry, previous theoretical studies
(e.g., Anand and Goyal, 2009, Kannan, 2010) have considered two learning aspects exhibited by
the players { the incentive to extract and the incentive to obscure private information { as well as
the trade-o between these incentives from the perspective of the market organizer. The managerial
insights oered by these analyses depend on steep informational and rationality requirements for
the players. Therefore, the relevance of these insights to practical, real-life situations remains an
open question. In this paper, we investigate these learning aspects empirically using an experiment
focused on one important application: procurement auctions.
Auctions are one of the most commonly-used mechanisms for procurement. General Dynamics,
GE, Sears Logistics, and Staples, are among the many organizations that have employed auction
technologies for procurement (Chandrashekar et al., 2007). These technologies enable a market-
maker to easily alter the information policy for an auction; i.e., the extent to which information
about bids are revealed at the beginning, during, and at the end of the auction. In fact, one of the
important problems in the procurement context is the choice of the information policy (Elmaghraby
and Keskinocak, 2000, highlights this issue). The problem has also been recognized in third party
electronic procurement marketplaces (see, e.g., Jap, 2002, 2003, Arora et al., 2007). For example,
in Freemarkets,1 a rm that specializes in organizing electronic procurement markets, the buyer
who convenes the market has a wide range of policy choices. At one end of the spectrum, the
buyer can accept sealed bids and simply notify sellers individually whether each of them won or
not. At the other end, all bids can be revealed as they are submitted, allowing bidders to respond
in real time. Dierent information policies have also been adopted in traditional marketplaces.
In federal and some state procurement auctions, the government is legally mandated to disclose
only the winner's bid at the end of the auction (Milgrom and Weber, 1982). By contrast, in
municipal construction contracting all bids are often revealed after the winner is selected (Thomas,
1996). Note that these procurement contexts typically feature repeated competition among the
same suppliers across dierent auctions (e.g., Milgrom and Weber, 1982). Because of this repeated
competition, the information revealed provides an opportunity for bidders to learn about their
1Freemarkets has merged with Ariba.
1opponents' private information (such as their costs) across auctions. This opportunity can lead
bidders to alter their behavior, which in turn aects the buyer's procurement costs.
In this context, we build on Kannan (2010) to model a procurement auction as a sequential
private value auction in which winners do not drop out from subsequent auctions. Our model also
permits bidders to have non-neutral risk preferences, since risk aversion has been documented as
important in environments such as auctions, where agents face uncertainty related to the value of
the object, the strategies used by others, and the private information possessed by their opponents.
We use the model to study the following two policies in a rst price sealed bid procurement auction:
(i) the Incomplete Information Revelation Policy (IIP), in which only the winner's bid is revealed
at the end of every auction, similar to the federal government mandated revelation policy; and (ii)
the Complete Information Revelation Policy (CIP), in which all bids are made public at the end of
every auction, similar to that in municipal construction auctions.
The perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium analysis of the two policies identies two key learning
eects. The extraction eect, which occurs under IIP, refers to the bidders' desire to alter their
bids so as to learn about the opponents' private information. The deception eect, which occurs
only under CIP, refers to the bidders' desire to prevent their opponents from learning about their
own private information by pooling with higher cost types. Although both these eects arise from a
bidder's desire to maintain a relative informational advantage over her competitors, their inuence
on market outcomes can be dierent. Both eects lead to higher prices, but either may have a more
dominant impact on procurement costs, depending on the degree of competition. Our analysis also
presents insights into how the learning eects interact with risk aversion. While the bids in IIP
decrease as the degree of risk aversion increases { a result consistent with previous ndings, e.g.,
Maskin and Riley (1984) and Maskin and Riley (1987) { the analysis of CIP reveals a surprising
result. We nd that the pooling rate (submitting a high bid) actually increases with risk aversion.
The steep informational and rationality requirements imposed to compute the two stage Bayesian
Nash equilibria are demanding, so the practical and descriptive value of the theory may be limited.
This highlights the need to test the predictive power of the theoretical results. An obvious way
to test the model would be through an empirical analysis of eld data. However, private infor-
mation about costs is typically not available, making such an analysis dicult. The choice of the
information policy is also endogenous in the eld, which complicates causal inferences.
2An experimental study, through its use of a controlled setting and exogenous manipulation of
information policies, can overcome these problems. Our experiment allows us to study bidding
behaviors under dierent, exogenously-imposed information policies. The experiment focuses on
the learning-related bidder behaviors which a buyer should consider when choosing procurement
auction information policies in environments characterized by dierent degrees of competition.
The analysis of our experimental data shows that bidders pool with high-cost types to prevent
opponents from learning signicantly more often under CIP, and the procurer pays less under IIP
only when the degree of competition is high. These results indicate that subjects behave as if they
can compute a perfect Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of this dynamic game, or at least appreciate the
intuition of the learning eects (the extraction and deception eects). We also observe that, in
general, learning eects shift bids in the predicted direction with regard to treatment variations in
the information policies and the degree of competitiveness in the market.
We also use the experimental data to apply a structural estimation procedure to estimate the
degree of risk aversion most consistent with the bidding behavior. Our estimation results show
that risk aversion is consistent with most of the overly-agressive bidding relative to the risk neutral
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium observed. Bidders in the CIP treatment, however, do not pool with
high-cost types at the high rates predicted by risk aversion. This may occur because cognitive
limitations prevent subjects from understanding the risk reduction benets of pooling, or because
of non-pecuniary benets of winning an auction. Thus, policy comparisons should also take these
cognitive limitations and winning incentives into account.
Our paper is distinct in the literature in several ways. An extensive literature in auctions has
analyzed the problem of information revelation in various contexts (e.g., Goeree, 2003, Das Varma,
2003, Katzman and Rhodes-Krop, 2008, de Silva et al., 2008, Chen and Vulcano, 2009). To the
best of our knowledge, our paper is the rst to experimentally study information revelation policies
in a repeated procurement auction setting. Moreover, the notion of learning we focus on is across
multiple stages within a game. It is dierent from prior experimental research which has exten-
sively analyzed learning across multiple iterations of the same game (e.g., Camerer and Ho, 1999).
Furthermore, the paper features theoretical, experimental, and structural estimation components.
Thus, by drawing upon a diverse set of research methodologies, we provide a comprehensive analy-
sis of the information policy choice problem. The analysis oers actionable managerial insights into
3the interaction between information disclosure policies and bidder learning eects. For example,
there is a perception in the industry that bid transparency leads to aggressive bidding behavior
and, therefore, lower buyer procurement costs, see e.g. Elmaghraby and Keskinocak (2000). How-
ever, the perception does not take into account obfuscation strategies which can be optimal with
complete revelation of bids.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature, and Section
3 summarizes the theoretical model and results. Section 4 presents the research hypotheses and the
experiment designed to test them. Section 5 reports the basic results and main hypothesis tests,
and Section 6 presents the structural estimation of the risk aversion model. Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature Review
2.1 Sequential Auctions with the Winner not Dropping Out
Suppliers in procurement auctions frequently compete against the same set of opponents across
dierent markets or in dierent auctions held sequentially by the same buyer. Therefore, we
model the procurement context as a sequential auction with the winner not dropping out. More
specically, the procurement setting is modeled as a private value auction, consistent with prior
works (e.g., Maskin and Riley, 2000, Bajari, 2001).
Most prior work in the area of sequential auctions has focused on winners dropping out (e.g.,
Krishna, 2009, Klemperer, 2004). One of the rst papers on sequential auctions with no winner
drop out is Ortega-Reichert (1968), where a CIP-like policy is considered but in a common-value
setting. A few other related papers have studied private value auction settings but have focused on
results when the objects across the stages are stochastically equivalent (Branco, 1997, Englebrecht-
Wiggans, 1994); have diminishing marginal valuations (Donald et al., 2006); or exhibit synergies
(Jeitschko and Wolfstetter, 1998).
Hausch (1986) extends the Ortega-Reichert (1968) common value framework to compare the
CIP-like sequential auction and the simultaneous auction. Two other closely related papers dealing
with private value auctions are Thomas (1996) and Tu (2005). Thomas (1996) focuses on studying
mergers, although part of his analysis compares policies that are similar to CIP and IIP. The model
is similar to the case in which two bidders repeatedly compete and each is equally likely to be a
low- or a high-cost type and their own cost type information is private. He concludes that CIP
4always generates higher buyer surplus and lower bids than IIP. This result is dierent from the
conclusion in Kannan (2010), which shows that the surplus ranking of IIP or CIP depends on
the distribution of cost types. In a recent work simultaneous to Kannan (2010), Thomas (2010)
considers a distribution of cost types but continues to recommend CIP based on the analysis
executed at the probability when the types are equally likely. Tu (2005) also analytically studies a
two bidder game where bidders have private information about their cost types, except that their
cost is drawn from a continuous distribution. He explicitly imposes an assumption that suppliers
cannot pool with other cost types and determines that CIP generates higher buyer surplus than
IIP. However, pooling is an important strategy we focus on in the present analysis.
2.2 Auction Experiments
Auctions have been studied extensively using experiments, including very practical applications
such as for the design of FCC spectrum auctions (e.g., Goeree et al., 2006). Kagel and Levin
(2010) provides a recent survey. Few experiments have focused on comparing the outcomes of
dierent information revelation policies in sequential auctions, and only two studies focused on
contexts similar to ours. Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2002) analyze the importance of information
disclosure policy in a common value setup like Hausch (1986). The main dierence, however, is
that while Hausch (1986) considers rst-price sealed-bid auctions, Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2002)
consider a setup where bidders agree to share the royalty with the buyer. They consider three
types of information revelation policies, including both of our policies where all bids, or all winning
bids, are announced by the auctioneer between stages. They consider a common value setting,
however, and bidders have no private value that could be potentially revealed from earlier bids,
and competing bidders do not interact repeatedly. Theory does not predict any dierence in bid
prices between the bid revelation policies, but they nd that when bidders are informed about
the losing bids in previous stages, prices are signicantly higher than the theoretical prediction.
Bidders become more competitive when this information is not revealed, which moves bids closer
to the theoretical prediction.
3 Theoretical Model, Equilibrium and Insights: Summary
In this section, we develop the theoretical results using a model similar to Kannan (2010), which
considers a two-stage, private-value, sequential auction model with no winner drop outs. While
5Kannan (2010) permits an arbitrary number of potential competitors, we examine the special case
of two bidders (or suppliers) in our experiment. However, in the present model, bidders can be risk
averse, while in the previous one they are all treated as risk neutral.
3.1 Model
Bidders are assumed to be characterized by a constant relative risk averse (CRRA) utility function
of the form U(x) = x(1 r), where x is the payo and r is the risk aversion coecient. Thus, the
risk neutral analysis is a special case of our model when r = 0. The CRRA approach "is the
most widely used parametric family for tting utility functions to data" (Wakker, 2008, p. 1329).
We also assume that bidders have private costs which are drawn from a discrete distribution of
two cost types.2 Let cl be the marginal cost of production for a low-cost supplier and ch for a
high-cost supplier, and  be the probability with which a bidder is a low-cost type. We assume
common knowledge of all three variables, although the outcome of the cost draw for each supplier
is private information. Since we focus on bidders' learning across auctions, we model a two stage
game, with each stage corresponding to an auction initiated by a buyer. The cost type for a bidder
is determined before the beginning of the rst stage and remains the same for both stages. In
each stage, both suppliers simultaneously submit a sealed bid, p 2 [0;1). Only one winner is
picked in each stage and he is the bidder with the lowest bid price in that stage (ties are broken
randomly). The winner's payo is his bid price minus his marginal cost, and the loser's payo is
zero. Therefore, the auction in each stage is a rst-price sealed bid type. Between the rst and
the second stages, information is revealed according to the policy. Under CIP, all bids are revealed
at the end of the rst stage; while in IIP, only the winner's bid is revealed. We are interested in
comparing the impact of the dierent information policies on bid prices and procurer surplus.
3.2 Equilibrium
The model specied above does not always have an equilibrium. Even single stage games, similar
to the ones we encounter in the second stage, may not have an equilibrium. We follow Maskin
2Prior work has also used a two-type framework to study information policies in other settings, in part because
some interesting aspects of learning across auction rounds do not exist in the continuous cost distribution case
(Jeitschko, 1998). The main advantage of the two-type model is that the second stage is a relatively straightforward
game and the analysis can focus on the learning eects in the rst stage. This advantage is lost even in a three-cost
type model, where the nature of the second stage equilibrium varies signicantly depending on the rst stage outcome,
which must also be considered by bidders in the rst stage.
6and Riley (1985) to overcome the non-existence problem by implicitly assuming discrete bids in
innitesimal increments.3 The game then has a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium under CIP
and IIP for each stage. We focus on the bidding behavior of the low-cost types since the bidding
behavior of the high-cost type is uninteresting. A high-cost type always bids ch in equilibrium
independent of the policy. In the rest of this section, we summarize the equilibrium results.
3.2.1 Second Stage
Since the equilibrium is derived by backward induction, consider rst the second stage. The second
stage across the two policies has commonality, which can be captured as follows. Suppose one
bidder, say A, believes that his opponent B is low-cost type with a probability of , while B believes
that A is low-cost type with a probability of . Let   , and suppose further that A already won
the previous period with a price of p. The prot expressions for A and B when they are low-cost
types and bidding a price of q are: A(q) = (1   FB(q))
 
(p   cl + q   cl)1 r   (p   cl)1 r
+(p 
cl)1 r and B(q) = (1   FA(q))(q   cl)1 r, where FA(q) and FB(q) are the cumulative density
functions (cdfs) of the bid distributions from players A and B. The equilibrium bid distributions
are computed in Appendix A.1.
3.2.2 CIP Game
The nature of the equilibrium in the rst stage game varies depending on  and r. We rst consider
a separating equilibrium in the rst stage.
Separating Equilibrium
Suppose a separating equilibrium exists in the rst stage. This implies that the rst stage reveals
the type of the bidder. As a result, the second stage simply corresponds to a Bertrand game. The
payo across both stages from bidding p in the rst stage is 
CIP-sep;(p) = (1   )(ch   cl + p  
cl)1 r+(1 F
CIP-sep;(p))(p cl)1 r, where F
CIP-sep;(p) is the cdf. The equilibrium bid distribution
is computed in Appendix A.2.1. Such an equilibrium is valid in the rst stage under CIP only when
 < 21 r 1
21 r+1. When  is larger than this threshold, the appendix also shows that only a semipooling
equilibrium exists. Since @
@r(21 r 1
21 r+1) < 0, the threshold degree of competition (i.e., ), above which
3Maskin and Riley's footnote 2 is directly applicable to our context: \As our model is formulated, an equilibrium
in the sealed-bid auction may not exist. The nonexistence problem, however, is an artifact of our allowing literally
a continuum of possible bids. In fact, we can restore existence even with a continuum by allowing the possibility of
positive but innitesimal bids, which we implicitly assume in our analysis."
7the semipooling equilibrium exists, decreases with r.
Semipooling Equilibrium
A semipooling equilibrium in the rst stage is one where the low-cost type pools with the high-cost
type and bids ch with a probability  < 1, or submits a bid p < ch, which reveals the low-cost type,
according to the cdf F
CIP-semi;(p). Let the corresponding pdf be f
CIP-semi;(p) and the inmum of
the distribution be p
CIP
l .
In the second stage game, three dierent possibilities exist: (a) When both bidders reveal their
type to be low-cost, the second stage game is a Bertrand game. (b) When both bidders pool, the
second stage game has  =  =

1 (1 ). (c) When one bidder pools but the other does not, the
second stage game has  = 1 and  =

1 (1 ). Using these second stage games, we compute the
rst stage prots from a non-pooling bid and a pooling bid:

CIP-semi;(p) = (1   F










(1   )(ch   cl + p   cl)1 r
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 1
1 r
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(ch   cl)1 r (2)
We use these expressions to compute the rst stage equilibrium in Appendix A.2.2.
Under CIP, our main focus is on the low-cost bidders' desire to pool in the rst stage with the
high-cost type. That incentive exists because, by preventing their opponent from learning about
their type, bidders gain an information advantage for the second stage. To see this, consider bidder
A who pools with the high-cost type in the rst stage. Then, a Bayesian-updating bidder B will
lower his belief in the second stage that bidder A is a low-cost type. This, in turn, allows bidder A
to undercut bidder B with higher probability in the second stage. We refer to this pooling strategy
in the rst stage as the deception eect.
3.2.3 IIP Game
Under IIP, where only the winner's bid is revealed, the equilibrium in the rst stage is separating
in nature. Suppose F
IIP;(p) and f
IIP;(p) are the cdf and the pdf of the rst stage bid distribution,
and p
IIP
l represents the inmum of the bid distribution. Then, the second stage game in IIP has
 = 1 and  =
(1 FIIP;(pw))
1 FIIP;(pw) , where pw is the rst stage winning bid. We account for the second







(ch   cl + pw   cl)1 r + (1   )(pw   cl)1 r 1





IIP;(p))(p   cl)1 r + (1   )
 
(ch   cl + p   cl)1 r   (p   cl)1 r
(3)
We can use this equation to compute the rst stage equilibrium (see Appendix A.3 for details.).
Note that there is no incentive under IIP for a low-cost bidder to pool with high-cost types in
equilibrium. To see this, consider deviations by one of the bidders from the separating equilibrium
identied under IIP. Instead of deviating and submitting a pooling bid, a low-cost bidder will be
better o with a bid slightly less than the pooling bid. If the opponent is a high-cost type, a pooling
bidder runs the risk of losing the rst stage with a probability of one-half; with a bid slightly less
than the pooling bid, she would have won the rst stage with certainty. The pooling bidder also
does not generate any benet when facing a low-cost opponent. When competing against a low-
cost opponent who is playing the strategy of the separating equilibrium, the pooling bid is never
revealed. Hence, deviating to a pooling bid does not alter the rst stage winner's belief for the
second stage. The pooling bid does not allow the deviating bidder to learn about the opponent
anymore than the bid slightly less than the pooling bid.
In IIP, only the extraction eect exhibited by the bidders comes into play. Since only the
winner's bid is revealed under IIP, a low-cost bidder gains more information about his opponent
for the second stage if he loses the rst. A winner, however, gains less information. Thus, the
policy creates an incentive for a low-cost bidder to bid higher and risk losing the rst stage game
to extract information about the opponent's type.
3.2.4 Analyses of Equilibrium Bids
This subsection characterizes properties of equilibrium bids that will be tested in the experiment.
Kannan (2010) identies the properties analytically under risk neutrality. In general, the equilib-
rium bid distributions are not analytically tractable for an arbitrary r. Hence, we characterize the
equilibrium bid properties through numerical analysis for the  values we use in our experiments,
 = f0:5;0:9g. These values satisfy the conditions in our theory for the extraction and the deception
eects to exist.
Figures 1(a) to 1(d) show the rst stage bid distributions under dierent CIP and IIP treatments
9(a) IIP ( = 0:5) (b) IIP ( = 0:9)
(c) CIP ( = 0:5) (d) CIP ( = 0:9)
Figure 1: First stage bid distributions for a low-cost type under IIP and CIP for dierent degrees
of risk aversion when cl = 200 and ch = 400.
for various r values. Figures 1(a) and 1(b) illustrate that bid distributions shift leftwards under
IIP as risk aversion increases. Hence, as risk aversion increases, individuals bid more aggressively
to increase the probability of winning. The shape of the bid distributions also show that there is
no positive probability for bids equal to ch under IIP, i.e., no pooling bids are submitted under IIP.
Comparing Figure 1(a) with Figure 1(b) shows that the bid distributions shift towards the left as
 increases. Hence, as the degree of competition increases, more weight is placed on lower bids.
Figures 1(c) and 1(d) show the bid distributions under CIP. Unlike for IIP, the bid distributions
in CIP for the risk neutral case do not rst-order stochastically dominate the risk averse cases. As
risk aversion increases, the bid distributions shift leftwards only in the lower and intermediate bid
ranges. In the upper bid range, however, the bid distributions shift downward. The downward shift
10in the bid distribution for bids of ch illustrates that players submit more pooling bids as the degree
of risk aversion increases. This result may be surprising at rst glance since pooling increases the
likelihood of losing in the rst stage and therefore appears to be a risky strategy. However, in this
multi-stage environment, one can show that pooling increases the likelihood of obtaining a positive
payo in the second stage and, hence, reduces the overall risk across the two stages. Recall that if
both bids are smaller than ch in the rst stage, both bidders are revealed to be low cost and thus
Bertrand competition results in zero prots in the second stage. Figure 2(a) shows the pooling
rates under both CIP treatments for dierent r values. The pooling rates increase in the degree
of risk aversion indicating the fact that bidders increase their pooling activity in both treatments.
The pooling rates increase faster in the less competitive environment than in the more competitive
environment.
Figure 2(b) shows the variation with respect to r of the expected rst stage bid from low-cost
bidders under CIP and IIP for the two  values. Consider the learning eects when risk aversion
(r) is low. The value gained from bid manipulations using both the extraction or the deception
eect depends on the priors. The extraction eect corresponds to bidders learning if the opponent
is a low-type. So, if the opponent is more likely to be a low-cost type anyway (i.e.,  is large),
the additional information value a bidder acquires through extraction is low. The deception eect
corresponds to a bidder preventing his opponent from learning about his low-cost type. So, if the
opponent is expecting the bidder to be a high-cost type anyway (i.e.,  is small), the additional value
from deceiving this opponent diminishes. Because of these two reasons, the extraction (deception)
eect dominates for lower (higher)  values, resulting in higher expected rst stage bids under IIP
(CIP), as observed in the gure.
As risk aversion increases, the comparison between CIP and IIP is also aected. The increasing
pooling probability under CIP leads to higher expected prices under CIP. The bids in IIP ( = 0:5),
however, decrease with an increase in r. Consequently, the dierence between the rst stage
expected prices under CIP and IIP policies decrease with r. When  = 0:5, the dominance of the
extraction eect over the deception eect can even vanish for very large levels of risk aversion (i.e.,
r > 0:7).
Figure 2(c) shows the expected price paid by the procurer across two stages in the four treat-
ments. We nd that when the competition is weak (strong), the prices paid in CIP are lower
11(a) Pooling rates (b) Expected rst stage prices
(c) Expected prices paid by the procurer
Figure 2: Pooling rates, expected rst stage prices and expected price paid by the procurer for
dierent treatments and dierent degrees of risk aversion.
(higher). The dominance of the extraction (deception) eect, which we noted earlier to occur when
the competition is weak (strong), is also the reason for this observation. This is valid for any
constant relative risk aversion parameter r.
4 Testable Hypotheses and Experiment Design
With the objective of experimentally studying the trade-os between the two learning eects, the
rst subsection below builds on the equilibrium results in the previous section to develop hypotheses
which we test in the experiment. The second section describes the experimental design.
124.1 Hypotheses
Note that the learning eects of interest are behaviors exhibited in the rst stage by the low-cost
types. Therefore, the rst three of our four hypotheses are related to the rst stage bids. The rst
hypothesis concerns pooling. For reasons discussed earlier, bidders submit pooling bids under CIP
but not under IIP. Therefore,
Hypothesis 1 The likelihood of pooling by a low-cost bidder is higher under CIP than under IIP.
The second hypothesis is straightforward and intuitive from the equilibrium bid distributions
(Figure 1).
Hypothesis 2 As the probability of observing a low-cost opponent increases, the average price bid
by the low-cost suppliers decreases.
The third hypothesis involves the comparison of the extraction and the deception eects. Notice
from Figure 2(b) that the dominance of one eect over the other depends on the risk aversion
parameter. Prior work (e.g., Goeree et al., 2002, Campo et al., 2003, Holt and Laury, 2002)
has identied a constant relative risk aversion parameter to be typically between r = 0:3 and
r = 0:6. Corresponding to that range, our theory predicts higher average bids in CIP for the
highly competitive ( = 0:9) treatment, and lower average bids for the less competitive ( = 0:5)
treatment. Therefore,
Hypothesis 3 When the probability of facing a low-cost opponent is low, the average price bid in
the rst stage by the low-cost suppliers is higher under IIP than CIP and vice-versa.
While the rst three hypotheses focus on the variations in the rst stage bidding behavior, the
next hypothesis concerns the procurer surplus over both stages. Based on the comparisons of the
expected price paid by the procurer across both stages, we have the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4 When the probability of facing a low-cost opponent is low, the total buyer payment
across both periods is higher under IIP than CIP and vice-versa.
Thus, we hypothesize that the procurer pays lower prices and obtains greater surplus on average
by choosing CIP in less competitive conditions.
134.2 Experimental Design
To test these hypotheses, we employ an experimental framework that implements the stylized model
summarized in Section 3 for the two values of  (0:5 and 0:9). For the experiments, we set cl = 200
and ch = 400. From the theoretical results in Section 3.2.4, it should be clear that policy variations
generate qualitative changes in bidder behavior because of the dierences in how bidders process
the information revealed. However, changes to  merely generate quantitative variations in the
strength of these incentives since the type of equilibrium remains unchanged. For this reason, we
vary  within the experimental sessions and vary the policies across sessions.
We created two datasets in the experiment, which dier in the restriction imposed on maximum
bids (the details are provided later). Each experimental dataset comprises of 8 sessions, with four of
them devoted to each information policy. Each session employs 12 subjects and involves 50 periods,
and each period consists of two stages. An iid Bernoulli process is conducted in each period to
determine the cost type for every subject, and this type remains the same for both stages of that
period. Since we are testing a noncooperative equilibrium of a one-shot, two-stage game, we reduce
repeated game incentives by randomly re-pairing the subjects with new opponents in each period.
Although subjects interact repeatedly across the 50 periods, their interactions are anonymous and
the identity of their interacting subject is never revealed. In each session, 25 periods are conducted
with one  treatment, followed by 25 periods for the other  treatment. We vary the sequence of
the  treatments across sessions in order to control for possible order eects. Thus, our combined
dataset consists of 9;600 bids in each stage from 192 dierent participants across the 16 sessions.
For the rst dataset, we assume that buyers have outside options to buy from suppliers if the
bids exceed the high costs. For example, this could arise if the buyers can produce in-house at the
same cost as the most inecient potential supplier, allowing them to credibly commit to a reserve
price of ch (Thomas, 2010).4 For this dataset we therefore explicitly restrict the maximum bid that
subjects can submit to ch. As we will present later, restricting the maximum bid to ch is quite
useful in providing managerial insights regarding the learning eects. The other advantage of this
restriction is that it facilitates an accurate identication of pooling bids, which are dened to be
equal to ch. However, the restriction may appear to be too strong as it rules out certain strategies,
4This is similar to the standard restriction in the extensive experimental literature on buying auctions that bids
are not allowed to be below the lowest possible buyer value.
14such as collusion among potential high-cost suppliers. Furthermore, the imposed bidding cap may
act as a focal point for bidders, leading to a second incentive for pooling besides the deception eect
identied in the model for the CIP condition. Therefore, as a robustness check we also conduct a
second set of experimental sessions.
This second dataset does not impose any explicit maximum bid restriction. We still, however,
implicitly restrict the maximum bid to be  35
18ch (=777) since without a cap our exposure for
potential monetary payments to subjects would be unbounded. Thus, in this design, the subjects
know that a cap on the maximum bid exists but are not aware of its value. The restriction is not
made explicit so that the revealed maximum bid does not become a focal point for the subjects.
We also choose a non-intuitive limit that is large enough to facilitate potential collusion but also
one that the subjects cannot easily arrive at through trial and error.5 Thus, our second dataset
overcomes the key potential problems with the rst dataset. The one obvious disadvantage is that
it becomes more challenging to dene pooling bids, since high-cost types often bid above ch. As we
will discuss in the results section, this implies that low-cost bidders who submit bids of ch might
not be interpreted as pooling.
The experimental sessions were conducted in the Vernon Smith Experimental Laboratory at
Purdue University. The subjects were recruited by email from the undergraduate student popula-
tion and each subject was limited to participate in one session. Upon arrival at their experimental
session, subjects were randomly assigned to individual computers and no communication between
subjects was permitted throughout the session. At the start of the experiment, the instructions
were read orally by an experimenter while the subjects followed along on their own copy. A sample
of the instructions is provided in Appendix C. A computerized program written in z-Tree was used
to implement the experimental environment (Fischbacher, 2007). The subjects in our experiment
act as bidders, who receive monetary payments of their bid price minus their cost when they win
an auction round and zero otherwise. The buyer's decision problem of picking the winner is com-
puterized because buyers have no strategic role for exogenously-determined auction policies. All
transactions and earnings are in experimental Francs, which are converted and paid in U.S. dollars
at the end of experiment using a known and constant conversion rate. The feasible bids are in 0:01
5Subjects who bid above this threshold of 777 received the following "error" message from the experiment software:
"The price you entered was too high. Please choose a lower price."
15precision between 0 up to the maximum value imposed for that dataset.
In the theoretical analysis, bidders update their beliefs using Bayes' Rule. To understand the
updating of beliefs in our experiment, we adopt a procedure (now common in the experimental
economics literature) to elicit beliefs directly. In each period at the end of the rst stage, every
subject is asked to state { based on the information revealed { his belief (expressed as a proba-
bility) that his opponent has a cost of cl. Monetary incentives are provided for making accurate
guesses. Specically, for eliciting the beliefs, we applied a quadratic scoring rule, which is incentive
compatible for players to state their true their beliefs (Selten, 1998, Nyarko and Schotter, 2002,
Costa-Gomes and Weizsacker, 2008). To reduce the likelihood that the belief elicitation reward sig-
nicantly aects bidding behavior, the maximum reward for the beliefs (20 experimental Francs)
is kept low relative to the dierence in ch and cl.
The sequence of the experiment is as follows: Each bidder submits his bid for the rst stage.
The buyer buys from the lowest bidder (ties are broken randomly). After all bids are submitted,
information about bids is revealed according to the chosen policy. Each subject then enters his
belief about the opponent's cost type and his bid for the second stage. At the end of the second
stage, the computers display the opponent's bids in the two stages and also the opponent's costs
and the subject's own earnings. Subjects record all this information on hard copy record sheets
so their personal history was easily accessible. Across all the 8-sessions, the earnings for the 192
subjects ranged from $17:00 to $40:00 with an average of $25:25 per subject. Sessions typically
lasted 90 to 100 minutes in total, including instruction time.
5 Results
In this section, we present the analyses of data obtained from our experimental sessions. Hereafter,
we refer to the data collected from the rst and the second set of experiments as Datasets 1 and 2,
respectively. Table 1 provides the summary statistics of the bids submitted by the low-cost bidders
for the rst and the second stages for both datasets. The top panel is based on data from all 25
periods of each treatment sequence while the middle panel is only from the last fteen periods in each
treatment sequence. The rst ten periods are excluded in the middle panel since those initial periods
may involve subjects learning about the process of bidding. The bottom panel shows the theoretical
mean values for the risk neutral case (r = 0). The variables used in the table correspond to the
16notation in the theoretical section: for a given treatment l 2 L = fCIP;IIPgf = 0:5; = 0:9g,
 pl is the average rst stage bid submitted by the low-cost bidders, and  l is the rate with which a
low-cost type bidder submits a bid  400.
Dataset 1 Dataset 2
Treatment CIP IIP CIP IIP
l !  = 0:5  = 0:9  = 0:5  = 0:9  = 0:5  = 0:9  = 0:5  = 0:9
All 25  pl 355.37 298.14 368.33 287.06 394.77 325.58 379.92 288.97
periods Stdev (44.94) (60.02) (41.52) (44.42) (43.40) (74.48) (50.61) (52.65)
included  l 8.16% 11.78% 2.21% 0.99% 49.66% 25.99% 32.31% 4.77%
N 588 1,112 588 1,112 588 1,112 588 1,112
Only  pl 358.73 299.46 372.00 277.12 390.29 328.20 379.99 284.55
periods Stdev (39.87) (64.76) (35.38) (41.47) (31.34) (77.85) (40.76) (49.24)
11-25  l 4.83% 15.36% 1.14% 0.45% 44.03% 29.22% 28.69% 1.66%
included N 352 664 352 664 352 664 352 664
Theory  pl 366.08 339.33 385.77 309.97 366.08 339.33 385.77 309.97
r = 0 l 23.95% 28.85% 0% 0% 23.95% 28.85% 0% 0%
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for bids submitted by low-cost bidders under CIP and IIP in both
datasets.
One can note from the top two panels of the table that several observations are consistent with
the theory across both datasets. For a given , the pooling probabilities are higher under CIP than
under IIP in each of the datasets. The average bids in less competitive treatments ( = 0:5) are
higher than the bids in more competitive ( = 0:9) treatments. Also, the bids are lower in IIP than
in CIP when  = 0:9.
We also note that some results are not similar across the datasets (but those dissimilarities are
valid across the top two panels). When  = 0:5, the average rst stage bids from low-cost types
are higher under CIP in Dataset 2 while the opposite holds in Dataset 1. Another result that is
not consistent across the datasets is the pooling probability under the IIP ( = 0:5) treatment. For
that treatment, while   is close to zero and seems consistent with theory in Dataset 1, it is not the
case in Dataset 2.
Table 1 shows that the average rst stage bid in each dataset is lower for all but one treatment
compared to the predicted Nash Equilibria under risk neutrality. The only exception occurs in
the CIP ( = 0:5) treatment in Dataset 2. These observations can also be inferred from the bid
distributions for all treatments shown in Figure 3, which usually indicate a greater weight on lower
17(a) CIP( = 0:5) (b) CIP( = 0:9)
(c) IIP( = 0:5) (d) IIP( = 0:9)
Figure 3: Theoretical and empirical rst stage bid distributions for a low-cost type
bids. These increased frequencies on lower bids support the notion that risk aversion may help
explain players' bidding behavior. We investigate the role of risk aversion later in Section 6.
5.1 Hypotheses Testing
The rst three hypotheses concern the rst stage bids from the low-cost sellers. We test these
hypotheses using both datasets and apply regression models which include the following control
variables: (i) the inverse of period (Inv Period) to account for nonlinear time trends, and (ii) treat-
ment order eects (Treat Seq), a dummy variable to dierentiate the rst and second treatments
run within a session. These control variables allow for learning or other time series adjustments
in behavior that are unrelated to the hypotheses of interest. In addition, we employ independent
variables that are relevant for the respective hypothesis. The regressions for Hypothesis 1, 2, and
3 account for unobserved subject heterogeneity as random eects in order to control for additional
18Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2
Dataset 1 { Probit Dataset 2 { Probit Dataset 1 { Tobit Dataset 2 { Tobit
 = 0:5  = 0:9  = 0:5  = 0:9 IIP CIP IIP CIP
Dependent Var. If a low-cost type pooled in the rst stage First stage bid from a low-cost type
Intercept -10.03** -4.78** -1.42** -3.46** 362.91** 358.29** 384.31** 402.81**
(1.18) (1.59) (0.57) (0.48) (4.15) (6.76) (4.92) (6.36)
Inv Period 0.98 -1.97** 1.59** -0.03 7.02* -21.02** 5.61 -7.60
(0.89) (0.49) (0.37) (0.25) (3.56) (6.85) (4.73) (7.07)
Treat Seq -0.37 0.28 -2.19** -0.33** 18.94** 17.30** -9.48** -17.35**
(0.92) (0.53) (0.64) (0.39) (1.84) (3.53) (2.43) (3.62)
Dummy CIP 3.76** 2.96** 1.61** 2.61**
(1.11) (1.34) (0.63) (0.48)
Dummy  0:9 -96.90** -58.14** -95.96** -63.98**
(1.84) (3.54) (2.44) (3.65)
Observations 704 1,328 704 1,328 1,016 1,016 1,016 1,016
Log L -41.18 -193.67 -248.96 -329.12 -4,856.04 -4,988.29 -5,163.81 -5,562.71
Table 2: Regressions to test Hypotheses 1 and 2 using both datasets. Numbers in parentheses
indicate the standard errors. Note that ** indicates a signicance level of 1%, and * a signicance
level of 5%. Regressions include subject random eects. The rst ten periods are omitted from the
analysis.
factors not captured by our independent variables.
Hypothesis 1 concerns the impact of the policy on the propensity to submit pooling bids. We
estimate a probit model with the dependent variable being a binary indicator that takes on a value
of one when the low-cost bidder bids 400 in the rst stage for both datasets. Since the focus here
is on the information policy, we consider the bids from low-cost bidders corresponding to each 
separately but pool the data across the policies. The base case corresponds to IIP, and the dummy
for CIP is the independent variable of interest. The regression coecients are shown in the left panel
of Table 2. They provide support for Hypothesis 1 for both datasets: the likelihood of observing
pooling is signicantly higher in CIP than IIP. Bidders perceive correctly that bidding to prevent
an opponent from learning one's cost type is more useful under CIP than under IIP.6
For the regressions testing Hypothesis 2, the dependent variable is the bid submitted by a low-
cost bidder. Since the maximum bid in Dataset 1 is 400, we employ a Tobit model with a 400
upper-bound. For Dataset 2, we employ a Tobit model as well with an upper limit of 777. We
consider the bids submitted by low-cost bidders under each policy separately. The base case is
when  = 0:5, and a dummy variable, Dummy  0:9, is set to one for  = 0:9. The rightmost panel
in Table 2 shows the regression results for both datasets. The coecients on Dummy  0:9 are
6A Hausman test conrms that xed eect results are not statistically dierent from the random eects results.
19Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 4
Dataset 1 { Tobit Dataset 2 { Tobit Dataset 1 { Tobit Dataset 2 { Tobit
 = 0:5  = 0:9  = 0:5  = 0:9  = 0:5  = 0:9  = 0:5  = 0:9
Dependent Var. First stage bid from a low-cost type Total price paid by the procurer
Intercept 373.82** 262.87** 383.75** 292.67** 784.28** 497.75** 790.18** 525.76**
(5.69) (7.01) (5.98) (8.27) (9.46) (5.46) (10.10) (5.70)
Inv Period -5.92* -7.51 1.58 -3.85 -28.65 -38.85** -6.08 -24.48**
(3.77) (4.84) (3.32) (5.30) (19.57) (11.69) (20.46) (12.21)
Treat Seq 4.28 31.73** -10.78 -13.60 14.36 33.03** -6.15 -34.60**
(6.51) (7.99) (6.85) (9.45) (9.34) (5.55) (9.72) (5.80)
Dummy CIP -14.87** 26.02** 10.46 43.30** -38.99** 26.47** -12.48 48.54**
(6.51) (7.99) (6.85) (9.45) (9.37) (5.55) (9.75) (5.80)
Observations 704 1,328 704 1,328 720 720 720 720
Log L -3,252.38 -6,550.25 -3,273.51 -7,125.47 -2,668.32 -4,105.69 -2,473.01 -4,094.52
Table 3: Regressions to test Hypotheses 3 and 4 using both datasets. Numbers in parentheses
indicate the standard errors. Note that ** indicates a signicance level of 1% and * indicates
signicance level of 5%. Regressions for Hypothesis 3 include subject random eects. The rst ten
periods are omitted from the analysis.
negative and highly signicant, consistent with Hypothesis 2. The data thus provide evidence that
as the fraction of low-cost bidders increases, the rst stage bids by low-cost bidders decrease.
To test Hypothesis 3, the regressions again use the bid submitted by a low-cost bidder as the
dependent variable. We consider low-cost bids from each  separately but pool the data across
policies. The base case corresponds to IIP, and a dummy variable equal to one for CIP is the
independent variable of interest. As before, we apply Tobit estimators for both datasets. The
regression results are shown in the leftmost panel of Table 3. The results for Dataset 1 are consistent
with the predictions of Hypothesis 3. The CIP dummy variable is negative and signicant for the
less competitive treatment, and positive and signicant for the more competitive treatment. This
indicates that the desire to learn dominates if the competition is weak (i.e., a lower  value), so
switching to a complete information policy lowers average bids. The results for Dataset 2, however,
are in line with Hypothesis 3 only for the more competitive environment ( = 0:9). For the
less competitive environment ( = 0:5) the estimate is not signicantly dierent from zero. We
investigate this deviation after testing Hypothesis 4.
For testing Hypothesis 4, the dependent variable is the sum of the prices paid by the buyer across
the two stages. We adopt IIP as the base case and measure the impact of switching to CIP through
the independent variable Dummy CIP. As before, we use Tobit models for both datasets.7 The
7Unlike the previous cases, these regression models do not include random subject eects because this market
level performance measure depends on both sellers in each market and sellers are randomly re-paired each period.
20regression results are shown in the rightmost panel of Table 3. For Dataset 1, the Dummy CIP
coecient is negative and signicant when  = 0:5, but positive and signicant when  = 0:9. This
result is consistent with Hypothesis 4, as the procurer pays less when adopting CIP only when the
environment is less competitive. In more competitive environments, the procurer pays more when
employing CIP since the low-cost bidders more frequently bid high prices to hide their type from
the other bidder. As in the previous hypothesis, for Dataset 2, the result is consistent with our
expectation only for  = 0:9. For  = 0:5, the Dummy CIP coecient is not signicantly dierent
from zero. This implies that a procurer pays about the same in CIP and IIP in an environment
characterized by low competition. Note that, while much of the results are consistent with our
expectations, the theoretically demonstrated dominance of the extraction eect over the deception
eect for average bids and procurement costs is valid only in Dataset 1.
5.2 Pooling in Dataset 2
To understand better why the last two hypotheses receive only partial support in Dataset 2, consider
again the pooling rates shown in Table 1 (Page 17). Note that these rates are signicantly higher
than the theoretical risk neutral case only for  = 0:5 in Dataset 2 under both policies. If we
specically focus on IIP across both datasets, observe from the table that the pooling rates are
much higher than the theoretically predicted value of zero for  = 0:5 in Dataset 2, and are always
higher in Dataset 2 than Dataset 1. These observations lead us to the following question: is the
denition of a pooling bid, based on theoretical reasoning, appropriate for Dataset 2?
Recall that in equilibrium the high-cost type bids ch regardless of their risk attitude, based on
the standard reasoning behind Bertrand price competition. The maximum bid of ch imposed in
Dataset 1 is therefore not binding in equilibrium, but when this bid cap is relaxed in Dataset 2
many high-cost bidders bid greater than ch. The bid distributions for these high-cost types shown
in Figure 4 indicate that these higher bids are most common in the less competitive ( = 0:5)
environment. Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) have shown in related experimental settings that
prices are signicantly higher than marginal costs in a two player Bertrand game. Similarly, our
high-cost types sometimes bid prices higher than their marginal costs. This provides opportunities
for the low-cost types to improve their prots with higher bids.
The price oers in Dataset 2 complicate our identication of a pooling bid by a low-cost type.
21Nearly 88% of all bids submitted by high-cost types exceed ch = 400, so by merely bidding at 400
a low-cost type is hardly pooling with the high-cost bidders behavior.
Pooling is only successful if it leads the other bidder to increase her belief that she is facing a
high-cost type, so the belief data that we have elicited from bidders can provide direct evidence
to infer pooling. This is easiest to illustrate in the CIP condition where all bids are observed. In
Dataset 1, where bids above 400 are not possible, for  = 0:5 a bid equal to 400 in stage 1 causes
the rival bidder to update her belief that the bidder is low cost to 0:17; and for  = 0:9 a bid equal
to 400 causes the rival bidder to update her belief that the bidder is low cost to 0:39. Thus, a bid
equal to 400 causes the rival to report a belief on average that the bidder is more likely to be a
high-cost type.8
By contrast, in Dataset 2 for  = 0:5, the high-cost types bid strictly greater than 400 in stage
1 almost 92% of the time. Consequently, a bid equal to 400 causes the rival bidder to update her
belief that the bidder is low cost to 0:57. That is, a bid of 400 leads the rival to believe that the
high-cost type is less likely than the prior. For  = 0:9 the high-cost types bid strictly greater than
400 in stage 1 83% of the time, and a bid equal to 400 causes the rival bidder to update her belief
that the bidder is low cost only to 0:70. Thus, in both cases a bid of 400 does not lead to a belief
update that a bidder is substantially more likely to be high cost and cannot be considered a bid
that is pooling with that type.
To pool with the high-cost types in Dataset 2, the low-cost types must bid somewhere within
the distribution of bids chosen by the high-cost types, and not on the boundary of this distribution.
Figure 4 shows that the distribution of these high-cost bids diers across treatments, with higher
bids considerably more common when  = 0:5. Thus, an empirically-based denition of a threshold
for identifying a pooling bid should vary with the treatment.
We considered a variety of alternatives for such an empirically-based denition of pooling bids.
We settled on a straightforward denition of a pooling bid: One that is greater than or equal
to the median bid submitted by the high-cost bidders in each treatment. Table 4 displays these
treatment-specic median-bid thresholds.
This table indicates that the median bids from the high-type, hMedian, are approximately equal
8These beliefs should not be updated in equilibrium to indicate the high-cost type with certainty, of course, because
some low-cost bidders are pooling with bids of 400.
22Figure 4: First stage bids by high-cost types, Dataset 2.
Treatment CIP IIP
l !  = 0:5  = 0:9  = 0:5  = 0:9
hMedian 420 404 419 401
phMedian 10.5% 16.1% 2.6% 0.6%
Table 4: Treatment-specic pooling bid thresholds in Dataset 2. hMedian is the median of bids
from high-cost types, and phMedian is the probability that a low-cost type bids equal to or above
hMedian.
between the CIP ( = 0:5) and IIP ( = 0:5) treatments. However, the frequency that the bids
submitted by a low-cost type are greater than or equal to hMedian is much higher under CIP than
IIP. This is consistent with the theoretical prediction that the deception eect is only present in the
CIP condition. Regardless of whether the pooling denition is adjusted as just described, pooling
is more common in CIP (Table 1), and regression results (available upon request) using the median
price for the pooling denition provide conclusions that are similar to those drawn from Table 2.
This complication for Dataset 2 arises because of non-Bertrand behavior by high-cost types in
stage 1. This may be because only two bidders compete in each auction. Dufwenberg and Gneezy
(2000) showed that Bertrand behavior is much more common with three or four sellers, which leads
us to conjecture that the high-cost types will typically submit bid equal to their marginal costs
when more than two bidders compete. Thus, dierences between Datasets 1 and 2 arising from
dierent bid caps may decrease substantially in less concentrated markets, with both behaving
similarly to Dataset 1 with its ch cap. Hence, we believe that the insights from the analysis of
Dataset 1 are more broadly relevant.
236 Risk Aversion
The previous section shows that the experimental data are broadly consistent with the comparative
static predictions of the theoretical model. Subjects exhibit behavior that appears to appreciate
the two learning eects. However, several quantitative deviations exist. As pointed out earlier,
most notably the observed average bids in Table 1 (Page 17) are lower for most treatments than
the risk neutral theoretical prediction. We next investigate how well risk aversion accounts for this
deviation. Note that risk aversion has also been proposed as an explanation for such deviations in
non-experimental auction data, even with large rms as bidders (e.g., Campo et al., 2003). In this
section, we use the theoretical results from Section 3 and follow a structural approach to estimate
the degree of risk aversion that is most consistent with observed behavior.
While the process can be applied to both our datasets, we only present the results for Dataset
1. In Dataset 2, the estimates obtained through the same procedure are problematic because, as
documented above, the bids from the high-cost types do not conform to the Bertrand prediction of
marginal cost oers. There is no easy structural way of accounting for this deviation, since it leads
low-cost bidders to bid above ch, which never occurs in equilibrium for any level of risk aversion.
For completeness, however, we report the risk aversion estimations for Dataset 2 in Appendix B.
6.1 Structural Approach for Estimating Risk Aversion
In this section, we account for mixed equilibrium strategies and apply a structural approach that
relies on the assumption that observed bids are generated from the equilibrium model, allowing
for risk aversion. Specically, we estimate the degree of risk aversion that minimizes the distance
between the theoretical and the empirical bid distributions.
Let pl
1;:::;pl
n be the observed rst stage bids from low-cost suppliers under treatment l 2 L =
fCIP;IIPg  f = 0:5; = 0:9g,9 and Xl be a set such that all the observed rst stage bids from
low-cost types are included distinctly (only once). The cdf of the observed bid distribution for








 ~ Fl (x), where I is the indicator function. Let the bids
originate from an underlying distribution with cdf for x being Fl(x; b r), where b r is the risk aversion
coecient of the subjects. For any arbitrary risk coecient r, Fl(x;r) indicates the cdf of the
theoretically generated bid distribution. For any x, the squared dierence between the cdfs of the
9Note that  p
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The objective is to nd the risk aversion parameter that minimizes the sum of squared dierences
between the theoretical and empirical bid distributions:10











r(x) can be interpreted as the errors arising from the agent's optimization, or
from considering a subset of the whole population. Since no closed form solution exists for the
equilibrium with non-neutral risk preferences, we apply a grid search over r in increments of 0:01.
In order to test for statistical signicance as well as equality of risk aversion estimates between
treatments we compute the standard errors using the non-parametric bootstrap method (with
replacement) as suggested by Efron (1982). Our estimate of the standard error is obtained using
500 bootstrap samples from the empirical distribution of the data.11
6.2 Results from the Estimation Procedure
We estimate the risk aversion coecient using the datasets with the rst 10 periods in each treat-
ment omitted in order to reduce the inuence of learning eects and adjustments to the treatment
conditions.12 The risk aversion coecient that best ts the 2;032 observations pooled across all
treatments is r = 0:38 and the bootstrapped standard error is 0:03. Thus, the estimate is signi-
cantly dierent from zero (risk neutrality). This estimate is consistent with previous ndings and
well-documented in experimental research focusing on rst price auctions with competing buyers;
see for instance Goeree et al. (2002), Cox et al. (1988), Harrison (1989) and Kagel (1995).
10In order to check for the robustness of this metric, we also use tests based on the supremum distance norm as
suggested by Romano (1988) and Romano (1989). We use a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test using the supremum distance
between the theoretical and empirical bid distributions and search over the dierent risk aversion parameters according
to the minimum distance principle. The optimal risk aversion parameter satises b r = argminr sup




The results are quite similar for most of the treatments, and they are available from the authors upon request.
11For tests at level 0.05, Efron and Tibsharani (1993) and Davidson and MacKinnon (2000) recommend 200 and
399 samples, respectively.
12This is the same subsetting to later periods employed in the initial equilibrium hypothesis testing in Section 5.
The estimation results using all periods are similar to the reported ones.
25All CIP IIP
Treatments  = 0:5  = 0:9  = 0:5  = 0:9
Dataset 1 Risk aversion coecient 0.38** 0.01 0.26** 0.57** 0.68**
Stdev (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.17) (0.02)
Observations 2,032 352 664 352 664
Table 5: Results for estimated risk aversion coecients. Numbers in parentheses indicate the
bootstrapped standard errors. Note that ** indicates a signicance level of 1%. The rst ten
periods are omitted from the estimations.
Table 5 shows the risk aversion coecient estimated overall and separately for every treatment.
Interestingly, the only treatment in which the data appear most consistent with risk neutrality
(r = 0) is the CIP ( = 0:5) treatment, which we investigate further.
For this CIP ( = 0:5) treatment, Table 6 shows the t error for various bid price ranges based
on the treatment-specic risk estimate (which corresponds to risk neutrality, r = 0) and the overall
risk estimate (which is r = 0:38). The overall risk estimate appears to be a better t for lower bid
prices. It is only in the higher bid prices does the t become better with the risk neutral case. One
of the key factors contributing to the better t at higher bid prices is the pooling rate. Notice that
the observed pooling rate (0:05 in these late periods) is much lower than the risk neutral equilibrium
(0:24), and is smaller than any higher theoretical risk aversion rate (cf Figure 2(a)). Consequently,
risk aversion does not t better in the last two rows in Table 6. The aggressive bidding in general
seems to indicate bidder behavior that is consistent with risk aversion. However, the lower pooling
rate and the continued aggressive bidding behavior at higher bid prices suggests that bidders do not
recognize the somewhat counter-intuitive incentive to increase their pooling rate with risk aversion.
This may be attributed to the cognitive limitation of our human subjects. While we have only
focused on risk aversion, other motivations such as a non-monetary utility of winning the auction
(Sheremeta, 2010), regret (Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok, 2008) or spite/envy Morgan et al.
(2003), can also inuence bidder behavior.
7 Conclusion
This study represents a rst step to provide empirical evidence regarding repeated auctions with in-
formation asymmetry and independent private values. We experimentally investigate how dierent










 300 0.056 0.056
 320 0.179 0.092
 340 0.225 0.096
 360 0.237 0.117
 380 0.258 0.216
 390 0.264 0.412
 400 0.385 1.018
Table 6: Sum of squared errors under CIP, based on Dataset 1.
Motivated by practical concerns faced by managers involved in intermediate goods transactions,
our analysis considers two stage procurement auctions in which bidders are uncertain about their
opponent's cost structure. We compare two dierent information revelation policies that could be
chosen by the procurer, one in which only the winning bid is revealed (IIP) and one in which all
bids are revealed (CIP).
Our analysis also provides several important managerial insights for participants in these tradi-
tional and online procurement markets. It shows that human bidders, even with limited training,
indeed appreciate the intuitions regarding the extraction and the deception eects. The theoretical
and empirical analysis shows that either eect can dominate the other, so buyer surplus could be
higher in either auction format depending on the perceived competitiveness in the market. There-
fore, both these eects are important and should be considered when choosing the appropriate
information revelation policy. Although the theoretical model with risk averse bidders shows a
surprising result { the direct variation of the pooling probability with the degree of risk aversion
{ the experimental subjects do not appear to correctly appreciate the risk reduction provided by
pooling. They bid aggressively even when pooling could reduce risk, perhaps due to an extra utility
of winning. We recommend that a manager also consider such cognitive limitations and winning
incentive when choosing the auction rules.
One may wonder about the applicability of our results beyond the two cost types studied.
As Lambson and Thurston (2006) note, a model assuming discrete type bidders is more realistic
than continuous type bidders. The discreteness naturally leads to bidders exhibiting learning-
related behaviors (Jeitschko, 1998), which is the focus of our paper. For an arbitrary number
of consumer types, the analyses of the two policies are not tractable. For the three-cost type
27framework, Kannan (2010) has already shown the existence of the extraction and the deception
eects. Using numerical analyses, he demonstrates cases when one eect dominates the other.
Given how remarkably subjects in our experiment appreciate the learning behaviors without even
computing the equilibria, we believe that those learning behaviors will be relevant even to settings
with an arbitrary number of cost types.
Future research could investigate whether the model is also generally well-supported if bidders
face more than one opponent. As theoretically shown by Kannan (2010), when the number of
bidders increases, this changes the equilibrium bidding behavior in the rst and the second stages.
It would also be useful to broaden the economic environment to include richer, possibly continuous
cost distributions, as well as more than two periods. Although these extensions have not been
addressed theoretically for repeated auctions of this type due to intractability, it is straightforward
to extend the present laboratory setup in this direction to assess the robustness of our main empirical
conclusions.
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Appendix A: Derivation of the Theoretical Model allowing for Risk Aversion
A.1 Second Stage Game Equilibrium
Note that the bid price innitesimally smaller than ch is the supremum of the strategy space and,
in a mixed strategy equilibrium, payos from any price q should yield the same payo. Based on





1   (1   )
(ch   cl + p   cl)1 r   (p   cl)1 r
(p   cl + q   cl)1 r   (p   cl)1 r
!
:
We nd that the inmum of FB(q) is q = 2cl  p+((1 )(ch  cl +p cl)1 r +(p cl)1 r)
1
1 r.










and a masspoint of 1
(q cl
q cl )1 r at the price innitesimally smaller than ch. In this case, the second
stage expected prots for A is (1 )((ch cl+p cl)1 r (p cl)1 r), and for B is (q   cl)
1 r. Using
these cdfs, one can directly obtain the pdf of the bid distributions. Let the respective probability
density functions (pdfs) be fA(q) and fB(q). Note that even if the beliefs are symmetric, the bid
distributions may be dierent because of A's gain from the previous period. Also, by rearranging
A(q), we obtain the following expression, which will be useful later:
(1   FB(q))

(p   cl + q   cl)1 r   (p   cl)1 r

= (1   )((ch   cl + p   cl)1 r   (p   cl)1 r) (5)
A.2 First Stage Game: CIP
Recall that under CIP, all bids are revealed. Two cases are possible
32A.2.1 Separating Equilibrium Case
Note that the price innitesimally smaller than ch is in the supremum of the strategy set and the
expected prot from any p in the mixed strategy equilibrium strategy set should be the same. Based








. As expected, the bids tend to be lower with increasing risk
aversion (=r) and higher degrees of competition (). The separating equilibrium is only sustained
under a certain condition. To determine when the separating equilibrium exists, consider deviations
by one of the bidders. Suppose a bidder pretends to be a high-cost type in the rst stage. The









(2(ch   cl))1 r +





(ch   cl)1 r +
Low-cost rival
z }| {
Bidder wins second stage
z }| {
(ch   cl)1 r:
We can observe that pool > (2(ch   cl))1 r(1   ), i.e., pooling is more protable, if  > 21 r 1
21 r+1.
A.2.2 Semipooling Equilibrium Case
We rst dene the variables for the second stage game. For case (b), the cdf of the rst winner's
bid distribution is denoted by Fws(q) and of the loser by Fls(q); the subscript s corresponds to the
case with symmetric beliefs. For case (c), the winner bids according to the cdf Fwa(q), and the
loser according to Fla(q), where the subscript a represents the asymmetric case. The corresponding
pdfs are fws(q), fls(q), fwa(q) and fla(q).
We next characterize the expected payos under two scenarios: (i) when the bid in the rst
stage reveals the type, and (ii) when the low-cost bidder pools with a high-cost type. Consider





(1   ) f
CIP-semi;(p)fwa(q)(p   cl + q   cl)1 r
+
Bidder wins stage 1; Both low-costs revealed =) 0 prot in stage 2
z }| {
(1   F
CIP-semi;(p)   ) f
CIP-semi;(p)(p   cl)1 r
+
Bidder wins both stages; low-cost rival hides
z }| {
(1   Fla(q)) f
CIP-semi;(p)fwa(q)(p   cl + q   cl)1 r
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33By rearranging and integrating with respect to the second stage bid, we obtain the conditional
prot of bidding p as:

CIP-semi;(p) = (1   F
CIP-semi;(p))(p   cl)1 r +
Z q=ch
q=q
(1    + (1   Fla(q)))

(p   cl + q   cl)1 r   (p   cl)1 r

fwa(q)dq
= (1   F
CIP-semi;(p))(p   cl)1 r + (1   )((ch   cl + p   cl)1 r   (p   cl)1 r)
The second equality is due to Equation 5. Simplifying the expression, we get 1. The expected
prot from any bid p can be obtained by setting F
CIP-semi;(p) for a p price innitesimally smaller
than ch to be 1   . Therefore,

CIP-semi;(p) = ( + (1   )21 r)(ch   cl)1 r: (6)
Next, we focus on scenario (ii). Consider the prot from submitting a pooling bid when q is
bid in the second stage:

CIP-semi;(ch;q) =
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Corresponding to the rst three terms, the winning bid price in the rst stage is always ch, and for
the last one it is some arbitrary p < ch. The rst two terms together relate to A, and the third
and the fourth terms relate to B in the second stage game. Using them, we have Equation 2.
We solve for the two variables F
CIP-semi;(p) and  using two equations, which are obtained by
setting any two of the following three equations equal: expected prot in Equation 1 for any p < ch;
the expected prot computed at the supremum of the strategy set, which is innitesimally smaller
than ch, in Equation 6; and Equation 2. The equilibrium bid distribution does not have a closed
form expression for any arbitrary r but is available for r = 0 (Kannan, 2010).
34A.3 First Stage Game: IIP
We again begin with the denition of the second stage variables. We represent Fw(q) and fw(q) as
those for the rst stage winner in the second stage; and Fl(q) and fl(q) for the rst stage loser in
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IIP;(p))(1   Fl(q))fw(q)(p   cl + q   cl)1 r f
IIP;(p)
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)(1   Fl(q)))
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((ch   cl + pw   cl)1 r + (1   )(pw   cl)1 r)
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Simplifying this, we obtain Equation 3. We dierentiate that equation with respect to p. The
left hand side expression tends to zero since the expectation of the prot from any of the actions
in the strategy set is the same. Using that, we obtain a dierential equation involving f
IIP;(pw)
and F
IIP;(pw), which when solved yields the equilibrium bid distribution. The dierential equation
does not have a closed form expression and has to be solved numerically.
Appendix B: Risk Aversion Estimates for Dataset 2
All CIP IIP
Treatments  = 0:5  = 0:9  = 0:5  = 0:9
Dataset 2 Risk aversion coecient 0.51** 0.62** 0.26** 0.01** 0.63**
Stdev (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.001) (0.02)
Observations 2,032 352 664 352 664
Table 7: Results for estimated risk aversion coecients. Numbers in parentheses indicate the
bootstrapped standard errors. Note that ** indicates a signicance level of 1%. The rst ten
periods are omitted from the estimations.
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Appendix C: Experiment Instructions (Complete Information Policy, θ=0.9) 
  This is an experiment in the economics of strategic decision making. Purdue University 
has provided funds for this research. If you follow the instructions and make appropriate 
decisions, you can earn an appreciable amount of money. The currency used in the experiment is 
francs. Your francs will be converted to U.S. Dollars at a rate of _____ francs to one dollar. At 
the end of today’s session, you will be paid in private and in cash. 
  It is important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you have 
any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will 
come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will 
not be paid. We expect and appreciate your cooperation. 
  The experiment consists of 50 decision making periods. Each period you will be grouped 
with one other person in the experiment. At the beginning of each decision making period you 
will be randomly re-grouped with another person. Since the groupings change randomly every 
period, you will be grouped with a new person in almost every period. These instructions are for 
Part 1, which lasts for 25 periods. You will receive additional instructions for Part 2. 
Your Offer Prices and Profits 
During each period, you can sell units of a fictitious commodity. If you sell a unit, then 
you will have to incur that unit’s production cost. Each period you and all other participants will 
make two choices—an offer price in stage 1 and an offer price in stage 2. Each represents an 
offer price to sell a unit of a fictitious good to the experimenter. You can sell one unit in each of 
the two stages. If you sell your unit, then you will earn profits (in experimental francs) equal to 
Your profits = Your offer price – Your production cost 
If you do not sell your unit in a stage, then your profit for that stage is 0. This will happen 
frequently, since only one of the two people in your group can sell a unit in each stage. 
For example, suppose your production cost is 200 and your offer price is 322, and you 
sell a unit in this stage. Then your profit would be 322 – 200 = 122 for this stage. Note that you 
only incur your production cost if you sell a unit. 
Costs are Determined Randomly 
Your costs and the costs of the other person in your group are determined randomly by 
the computer at the start of each period. Everyone’s costs remain unchanged for both stage 1 and C-2 
 
stage 2 within a period, but then they are randomly determined again at the start of each period. 
There is a 90% chance that your cost is 200 and a 10% chance that your cost is 400. 
Which cost you have this period is determined through a (virtual) “ball draw” from a bingo cage 
containing 10 balls, comprised of 9 red and 1 black balls. If a red ball is drawn then your cost is 
200 and if a black ball is drawn then your cost is 400. The other person in your group will have a 
separate ball draw (with replacement) to determine his or her cost. Everyone will have a new ball 
draw to determine cost at the start of every period. Everyone always simply has a 90% chance 
(that is, a 0.9 probability) of having a 200 cost. Remember, everyone’s cost also remains 
unchanged over the 2 stages of each period. 
 
Submitting Your Offer Prices 
You will submit your offer prices using your computer. An example screen for Stage 1 is 
shown above. As you can see on this screen, you will know your cost for the period before you C-3 
 
submit your offer, but you will not know the cost (or the offer price) of anyone else at this stage. 
Up to two decimal places are permitted for any price offer. 
Determining Who Makes the Sale 
The computer determines whether you or the other person in your group makes the sale 
each stage following a very simple rule: The lowest offer price in your two-person group sells 
the unit, as long as this lowest offer price is not greater than 400. Since the computerized buyer 
will not pay more than 400 for a unit, any offer that you submit that is greater than 400 will be 
automatically lowered to 400. If the two offer prices are equal, then the person who sells the unit 





Stage 2: New Offer Prices 
You will learn the Stage 1 offer price submitted by the other person in your group at the 
start of Stage 2, as shown above. This screen will also indicate who sold a unit in Stage 1. At this 
point you will submit a Stage 2 offer price, at the same time the other person submits her price. 
Your cost does not change between the two offer stages. 
Guessing the Cost for the Other Person 
  The other person’s cost also does not change between the offer stages. At the same time 
that you submit your Stage 2 offer price, you will also enter a guess about the chances that the 
other person has a cost of 200. (Remember, we already told you that costs are determined 
randomly at the beginning of the period, and everyone always has a 90-percent chance of having 
the cost of 200 for the period.) What you enter on your screen is the probability that the other 
person has a cost of 200 this period. For example, if you think that she has a 50-percent chance 
of having a cost of 200, then you enter 0.5. Or, if you think that she is three times as likely to 
have a cost of 200, rather than the cost of 400, then you enter 0.75. (Up to two decimal places are 
allowed.) Or, if you think that she certainly does not have a cost of 200, then you enter 0. 
  Your guess can earn you additional money. At the end of the period, we will show you 
the cost of this other person, and compare it to your guess. We will then pay you for the accuracy 
of your guess as follows: 
Suppose you guess that the person you are grouped with has a cost of 200 with a 75% 
chance and a cost of 400 with a 25% chance (as in one example above). Suppose further that this 
person actually has a cost of 400. In that case your  
Guess Payoff = 20 – 10(1-0.25)
2 – 10(0.75)
2 = 8.75 francs. 
In other words, we will give you a fixed amount of 20 francs from which we will subtract 
an amount that depends on how inaccurate your guess was. To do this we use the cost of the 
person you are grouped and we will take the probability you assigned to that cost, in this case 
25% on 400, subtract it from 100% and square it. We will then take the probability you assigned 
to the wrong cost, in this case the 75% you assigned to 200, and square it also. These two 
squared numbers will then be multiplied by 10 and subtracted from the 20 points that we initially 
gave you, to determine your final guessing payoff (which is 8.75 francs in this example).  C-5 
 
Note that you get the lowest payment under this payoff procedure when you state that 
you believe that there is a 100% chance that the other person has a particular cost when it turns 
out that she actually has the other cost. In this case your guessing payoff would be 0, so you can 
never lose earnings from inaccurate guesses. You get the highest payment if you guess correctly 
and assign 100% to the cost that turns out to the actual cost of the person you are grouped with; 
in this case your guessing payoff would be 20 francs. 
Note that since your guess is made before you know the cost of the person you are 
grouped with, you maximize the expected size of your guessing payoff by simply stating 
your true beliefs about what you think this other person’s cost is. Any other guess will 
decrease the amount you can expect to earn from your guessing payoff. 
The End of the Period 
  After everyone has submitted offer prices for both stages of the current period you will be 
shown the final results screen, as shown on the next page. This screen displays your offer prices 
as well as the offer price and cost of the person you are grouped with for the current decision 
making period. It also shows your total earnings for this period and your cumulative earnings for 
the experiment so far.  
Once the outcome screen is displayed you should record your offer prices, cost, and the 
other person’s offer prices and cost on your Personal Record Sheet. Also record your current and 
cumulative earnings. Then click on the continue button on the lower right of your screen. 
Remember, at the start of the next period all participants are randomly re-grouped, and you are 
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